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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
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I
I

Plaintiff and
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I
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I
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I

Defendant and
Appellant.

I
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FRANCIS M. WIKSTROM, ESQ.
9 Bank of Utah Building
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Respondent

I'_.

RONALD 11..

Legal

244.7 Kiesel
Ogden, t1t:.ak

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE ••.•.•••.••..••••••• , , •• , , , , •. • 1
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ..•••••.•••..••.•••.•••••••.•• , , •• 2
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL .•••..••.•••••.•••••••••••••.•••••••• 2
STATEMENT OF FACTS .•••••.•••.•••.•• , .•••.•• , . , •.• , , •••• , • , , • 2
ARGUMENT •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••• 3

POINT I
DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
WAS ERROR •...••••..•.•..•••..•••••.•••••••••••••••• ,,,, .3
POINT II
REFUSAL OF COURT TO GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS AFTER RESPONDENT HAD RESTED HIS CASE IS
ERROR •••.•.•.••.••.•••.•.•••••••.•••••.••••••••••••••••• 8
POINT III
THE REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO INSTRUCT JURORS ON
LACHES AND ESTOPPEL IS ERROR •...•••.••••••.•••••••••••• 10
CONCLUSION ..... , •••..•••.•...•..•••••••••.••••••••••••• • •• • 13

i

j

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASE CITATIONS
Brown v. Marrelli
527 P.2d 230 (Ut., 1974} ••..•••••••.•••••.•• , .•••.•.•.•••.•• 5
Buell v. City of Bremerton
495 P.2d 1358 (Wash., 1972} •.•••••••••••.•••.•••••••.•••••• 12
Davey v. Davey
50 Cal.App.2d 15, p.20; 122 P.2d 308, p.310 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Hanns v. Hanns
423 P.2d 499 (Ore., 1967) ••••••.•..•••..••••••••••••••••••• 12
Martinez v. Romero
558 P.2d 510 (Ut., 1976) ••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 6, 7
McCoy v. Severson
222 P.2d 1058 (Ut., 1950) •••••.•••••••••••••••••••••.••••••. 4
In Re People In Interest of L.B.
498 P.2d 1157 (Colo., 1972) .•••..••.•.•••••••.•••••••••••.•. 5
Seeley v. Park
532 P. 2d 684 (Ut., 1975) .•••.••••.•••.•••••••.••••••.•••••.• 7
Smith v. Heilman
340 P.2d 752 (Cal., 1959) ••.•••.•••••••••••••••.•••••••••••. 9
State of Utah v. Abram
495 P.2d 313 (Ut., 1972) ••.•••••••.•.••••.•••••••••••••.•.•. 4
State of Utah v. Judd
493 P.2d 604 (Ut., 1972) ••••••••• .•••••••.••••••••••..••• 4, 5
UTAH STATUTES
77-60-1, et seq., U.C.A., 1953 •••..•.••.•.•••.•.•••.•••.••.. 4
77-60-15, U.C.A., 1953 •.••...•.•.•.••..••..•.•.•.•.•••••• 4, 7
78-12-1, U .C.A .•••.•.••.•••••.•••••••••••••.•••••••••• • · • • • • 7
78-12-22, U.C.A ••••••.•••.•.•.•••..••.•.••••.••••...•• • · .6, 7
78-45A-l, et seq., U.C.A ••.•.••••..•..••.•••.•••••••.•.•• 5, 6
78-45A-3, U .C .A •..••...••••.•.•.•• , •.••.••.• , ••••.•.•.•. ·.·• 5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

BARBARA ZITO,

I

Plaintiff and
Respondent,

I

I

vs.

Case No. 15493

I

GARY BUTLER,
Defendant and
Appellant.

I
I
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action in paternity brought by the Respondent
against the Appellant, wherein the Respondent sought to obtain
a Judgment finding the Appellant as the natural father of Shauna
Zito, for reasonable expenses of Respondent, for past support,
for future support, and for attorney's fees.
The Appellant filed an Answer alleging the affirmative
defenses of statute of limitations, laches, waiver, and estoppel
resulting from Respondent's failure to initiate this action
seeking declaration of paternity against the Appellant.
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--Appellant seeks a determination as to whether or not
the affirmative defenses of !aches, waiver, and estoppel are
permissible to the Respondent's Petition for a Declaration
of Paternity, and for child support.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Lower Court from a jury verdict in favor of the
Respondent in its action for a Declaration of Paternity and
for past and future child support, declared the Appellant to
be the father of the minor child, and to remit the amount of
past child support due and owing to the Respondent.
The Lower Court did further make an Order setting forth
the amount of child support the Appellant would be required
to pay to the Respondent on behalf of said minor child in the
future.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment and final Order
of the Lower Court, which denied to the Appellant the right
to assert the affirmative defenses of the statute of limitations,
!aches, waiver, and estoppel at time of trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondent commenced an action on or about February 18,

1976, seeking a declaration against the Appellant as the putative
-2-
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father of the minor child, Shauna Zito, born to the Respondent
on September 2, 1971.

(R-1)

The Appellant filed an Answer to the Respondent's Petition
on or about March 12, 1976, wherein the Appellant did set forth
the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations, the
affirmative defense of laches, the affirmative defense of estoppel,
in addition to denying paternity.

(R-4,-5)

The Appellant did file a Motion for Summary Judgment
on or about April 10, 1976, alleging that the affirmative defenses
set forth in Appellant's Answer was dispositive of the issues
before the Lower Court (R-10).

The Honorable Calvin Gould

denied the Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment in a Memorandum
Decision dated June 4, 1976, holding that the issue of paternity
could be determined where the Respondent had commenced an action
more then four years after the birth of the minor child.

(R-

23)

The matter came on regularly for trial on October 5,
1977, before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, Judge, sitting
with a jury.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
WAS ERROR.
The Honorable Calvin Gould did render a Memorandum

-3-
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Decision on or about June 4, 1976, wherein he denied the Plaintiff'
Motion for Summary Judgment stating an issue of paternity may
be determined in this action.
The Supreme Court of Utah held that the passage of the
Uniform Act on Paternity did not supersede nor impliedly repeal
the Utah Bastardy Act, U.C.A., 1953, 77-60-1, et seq., in~
of Utah v. Abram, 495 P.2d 313 (Ut., 1972).

It, therefore,

appears that there are two methods whereby a mother of an illegiti·
mate child may seek a declaration of paternity and child support
from the child's alleged natural father.
This Court also held in State of Utah v. Judd, 493 P.2d
604 (Ut., 1972), that the Bastardy Act and the Uniform Act
on Paternity are substantially the same, except for the manner
in which the proceedings are initiated.
This Court further stated in the Judd case, that:
It appears therefrom an express intention upon the
part of the legislature to retain the Bastardy Act,
and there is no justification for determination, that
the legislature intended to repeal the earlier Act •..
It is a rule of statutory construction, that where
there are two or more statutes dealing with the
same subject matter, they will be construed so as
to maintain the integrity of both. Repeal by implication is not affected unless the terms of the later
enacted law are irreconcilable with the former. (Citing McCoy v. Severson, 222 P.2d 1058 (Ut., 1950).
The Bastardy Act, U.C.A., 1953, 77-60-15, provides that
no prosecution under this chapter shall be brought after four
-4-
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-years from the birth of such child.

The Uniform Act on

Paternity, U.C.A., 78-45A-l, et seq., does not set forth any
statute of limitations upon which an action may be commenced,
but, it does, however, provide in U.C.A., 78-45A-3, that a
father's liability for past education and necessary support
is limited to the four years next preceding the commencement
of an action.
Therefore, it appears in following the Utah Supreme
Court's rule of statutory construction as pronounced in State v.
Judd, supra, where there are two statutes which relate to the
same subject matter, as is true in the instant case, the
Court will construe such statutes in a manner maintaining the
integrity of both.

The similarity of the Bastardy Act and

Uniform Act on Paternity has been acknowledged in State v.
Judd, supra, and Brown v. Marrelli, 527 P.2d 230 (Ut., 1974).
The two Acts being alternative remedies, involving like
subject matter, both the Bastardy Act and the Uniform Act on
Paternity should be given effect so long as the two Acts are
not irreconcilable.
In Re People In Interest of L.B., 498 P.2d 1157 (Colo.,
1972), the Colorado Supreme Court held where there is a specific
statute setting forth a statute of limitations for paternity,
that the issue of paternity cannot be adjudicated "as an adjunct"
-5-
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of support proceedings where support proceedings are not commenced
within the five-year (paternity) statute of limitations.
The Appellant submits that since the Utah Bastardy Act
provides a four-year statute of limitations from the date of
birth of the child and the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity provides
that recovery from the father is limited to the four years
next preceding the commencement of an action, the two Acts
can be construed so as to maintain the integrity of both statutes
by applying the four-year statute of limitations in actions
brought under both Acts and by permitting the party seeking
a declaration of paternity to recovery for past education and
necessary support to the four years next preceding the commencement
of the action,

(a remedy not afforded under the Bastardy Act).

The Appellant distinguishes the present case from the
holding of this Court in Martinez v. Romero, 558 P.2d 510 (Ut.,
1976), wherein the issue presented to the Court was whether
an action could be commenced pursuant to U.C.A., 78-45A-l and
~.

for past support and confinement and also an Order for future

support to be sought under the Uniform Act on Paternity more
then eight years after the birth of the child.
It appears to the Appellant that the Utah Supreme Court
therein held, that an action not brought within eight years
is barred by U.C.A., 78-12-22.
That U.C.A., 78-12-22, provides that:
-6-
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78-12-22. Within eight years - Within eight years:
Any action to enforce any liability due or to become
due, for failure to provide support or maintenance
for dependent children.
That U.C.A., 78-12-22, sets forth a statute of limitation which is more specifically referred to in U.C.A., 78-12-

!'

which provides that:
78-12-1. Time for Conunencement of Action
Generally - Civil actions can be conunenced only
within the period prescribed in this chapter,
after the cause of action shall have accrued,
except where in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by statute.
This Court held in Seeley v. Park, 532 P.2d 684 (Ut.,

1975), that the eight-year limitation of U.C.A., 78-12-22,
applied to past due alimony and support.
However, the holdings of Seeley v. Park, supra, and
Martinez v. Romero, supra, are distinguishable from the instant
case, in that Seeley v. Park concerned child support pursuant
to a Decree of Divorce and Martinez v. Romero only presented
the issue, that a paternity action could not be conunenced more
then eight years after the birth of the child under the Uniform
Act on Paternity and did not consider the affect of U.C.A.,
78-12-1, on u.c.A., 78-12-22, in that such a consideration
was unnecessary under the facts of that case.
It is submitted, that U.C.A., 77-60-15, which sets forth
a four-year statute of limitations issue is within the "special
cases" of u.c.A., 78-12-1, and precludes the Respondent from
-7-
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proceeding against the Appellant in an action seeking a declaratio:.
of paternity more then four years after the birth of the child.
POINT II
REFUSAL OF COURT TO GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS AFTER RESPONDENT HAD RESTED HIS CASE IS
ERROR.
That the Appellant, upon the Respondent resting his
case, made a Motion to Dismiss on the basis that the Respondent
had failed to set forth a prima facie case, in that there was
no showing as to the gestation period and no showing as to
when the Respondent did become pregnant (R-181,-182).
That while it does appear from the testimony of the
Respondent, that Respondent was engaging in a sexual relationship
with the Defendant in November, December of 1970, and January
of 1971, and the Respondent further testified that:

Q.

I see. Now, did there come a time, Barbara, when
you discovered that you were pregnant or you
thought you might be pregnant.

A.

Yes.

Q.

But when was that?

A.

Probably in about January.

(R-153)

The Respondent did further testify that she consulted
a doctor around the 1st of March, 1971, and the Respondent
was permitted over the objection of the Appellant to testify
as to the results of the doctor's examination and that the
Respondent was pregnant at that time.

(R-154)
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That the Lower Court erred in admitting such unsupported
evidence, and said that:
The Court:
She may answer the question if the answer
was given in the course of ordinary treatment.
That the Rules of Evidence as adopted by the Supreme
Court of Utah, and particularly Rules 62 and 63, which define
"hearsay" and the exceptions thereto, do not set forth an exception
for treatments made during the course of ordinary treatment.
The California Supreme Court in Smith v. Heilman, 340
P.2d 752 (Cal., 1959), stated that:
As above stated, in the present case the period of
gestation was 188 or 190 days.
In Dazey y. Dazey
P.2d 308 [at. ;:iug

50 Cal.App.2d 15, at page 20, 122

310], it was said in referring to a medical

text book, that:
"'It is customery to recognize a length of pregnancy
as nine calendar months, or ten lunar months, 280
days duration, dating from the first day of the last
menstruil.tion period.'"
It was also said therein, 50 Cal.App.2d at page 20,
122 P.2d at page 310, that:
This author also plainly states, that if we compute
the period from fruitful coition to birth, [period
gestation] there is from 220 days to 330 days.
The attending physician, called as a witness by
Defendant, testified that, in determining a date
when a child will be born, the members of the
medical profession count 280 days from the last
menstrual period, but if they could actually know
the date of fruitful coition, they would count
-9-
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the time of delivery from that date; that there
is no cognizable in the medical profession, that
the period of pregnancy range from 220 to 330
days; that there is no hard and fast rule limiting
the periods of pregnancy; that he would not consider
it an average case if a child were born 190 days
after fruitful coition, but he would not say
that it was an abnormal case.
Therefore, it is submitted that without testimony as
to when the Respondent became pregnant and that she only suspected
being pregnant in January, 1971, and the gestation period in
this particular instance not being shown, the Appellant's Motion
to Dismiss should have been granted, in that the jury would
be required to speculate as to when the Respondent did become
pregnant and such speculation should not be permitted where
the Respondent could have produced testimony establishing the
date of impregnation and that such impregnation did occur in
November or December of 1970 and/or January 1971, those being
the months the Respondent testified having sexual intercourse
with the Appellant.

(R-152,-153)
POINT III

THE REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO INSTRUCT JURORS ON
LACHES AND ESTOPPEL IS ERROR.
The Defendant requested three jury instructions concerning
the defenses of laches, estoppel, and waiver, and the Court
refused such instructions as submitted by the Defendant.
218)
-10-
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(R-

The jury instructions on laches, estoppel, and waiver
(R-89,-90,-91), are proper instructions and should have been
submitted to the jury on the basis of the testimony of the
Respondent, wherein the Respondent stated that:

Q.

Okay. Mrs. Zito, after receiving this letter,
no further action was taken, was it?

A.

No, there was not.

Q.

That was the end of the proceedings there, wasn't
it?

A.

Uh huh.

Q.

You elected at that time not to proceed, didn't
you?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You knew at that time you had the right to go
after him, though.

A.

You bet I did.

Q.

For the same thing you are going after him for
right now, didn't you.

A.

Uh huh.

(R-173)

The letter which is being referred to above is the letter
written to Attorney Findley P. Gridley who was representing
the Respondent in September, 1972, and this letter is the reply
to the communication from Attorney Gridley to the Appellant
seeking a declaration of paterntiy by the Appellant for the
minor child.

(Def.Exh.6)

It is submitted that the testimony of the Respondent
-11-
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was such that the failure of the Court to instruct the jury
on the defenses of laches, waiver, and estoppel was error,
and that such defenses should have been submitted to the jury.
That the Supreme Court of Washington held in Buell v.
City of Bremerton, 495 P.2d 1358 (Wash., 1972), that:
The element of laches are:
(1) knowledge of
reasonable opportunity to discover on the part
of a potential Plaintiff, that he has a cause
of action against the Defendant; (2) An
unreasonable delay by the Plaintiff in commencing that cause of action; (3) Damage to the
Defendant resulting from the unreasonable
delay. None of these elements alone raises
the defense of laches.
Laches is an implted waiver arising from knowledge of existing
conditions and acquiescence in them.
Similarly, in Hanns v. Hanns, 423 P.2d 499

(Ore., 1967),

the Oregon Supreme Court held, that laches is neglect for unreason·[
able and unexplained length of time under circumstances which
would permit diligence to do in law what should have been done
and which results in a disadvantage to the other party.
The Appellant testified, that had the Respondent proceeded
in September or October of 1972, that his recollection as to
dates and places concerning the paternity charge would be better.
(R-188)

Therefore, it is submitted that the long delay of

the Respondent, when said Respondent knew that a proceeding
could be instituted against the Appellant herein, resulted
in a detriment to the Appellant, in that his ability to recollect
dates and places diminished, and that the failure of the Responder.
-12-
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'

to proceed on her claim in 1972 constitutes laches and the
Respondent should be estopped from now proceadi~g ~gainst tQe
Appellant.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted to this Honorable Court, that the statute
of limitations barred the Respondent from proceeding against
the Appellant for a declaration of paternity, in that more
than four years have elapsed from the child•s birth until the
action was commenced.
It is further submitted, that the Trial Court erred ,
in not granting the Appellant's Motion to Dismiss, in permitting
the Respondent to testify to matters which do not fall within
the hearsay exception, and refusing to instruct the jury as
to the defenses of laches, estoppel, and waiver in light of
the testimony received by the Court.
Respectfully submitted this 17 day of January, 1978.

~~
e'N.

Vla~~

Attorney for Appellant
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogd
Utah 8440

~£ tc/,~

onald w. Perkins
Attorney for Appellant
Legal Forum Bumlding
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

A copy of the above and foregoing Brief of Appellant
was posted in the U.S. mail postage prepaid and addressed
to the Attorney for the Respondent, Francis M. Wikstrom,
9 Bank of Utah Plaza, Ogden, Utah 84401, on this ~day
of January, 1978.
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